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Summary
The issue of life imprisonment is always a contentious one. Some people 
argue that life imprisonment should mean what it means, namely ‘whole-
life’. In Uganda, life imprisonment continues to mean imprisonment of 20 
years. However, in 2005 the Constitutional Court ruled that life imprison-
ment should mean ‘the whole of a person’s life’. This decision is not yet 
law, because the particular case is on appeal before the Supreme Court, 
which will either uphold the Constitutional Court’s ruling or not. This 
article deals with the constitutionality of long prison sentences that the 
Constitutional Court suggested could be imposed to avoid prisoners being 
released after 20 years. It also argues that the Supreme Court should reject 
the Constitutional Court’s ruling that life imprisonment should mean the 
whole of the prisoner’s life. The human rights and administrative impli-
cations of ‘whole-life’ imprisonment are discussed in detail to support 
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the view that life imprisonment should remain as is, that is, 20 years in 
prison. The author draws inspiration from other domestic jurisdictions and 
international law to support his argument. In particular, the author looks 
at jurisprudence from Germany, South Africa, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the International Crimi-
nal Court and the European Court of Human Rights. Where applicable, 
the views of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights are 
highlighted.
1 Introduction
The sentence of life imprisonment is … unique in that the words, which 
the judge is required to pronounce, do not mean what they say. Whilst 
in a very small minority of cases the prisoner is in the event confined for 
the rest of his [her] natural life, this is not the usual or intended effect of a 
sentence of life imprisonment … But although everyone knows what the 
words do not mean, nobody knows what they do mean, since the duration 
of the prisoner’s detention depends on a series of recommendations … and 
executive decisions …1
The sentence of life imprisonment is truly unique. If many people, 
including some lawyers, were asked to explain what exactly life impris-
onment means, many would say that it means that a person sentenced 
to life imprisonment will spend the rest of his or her life in prison or, 
as the Nicosia Assize Court of Cyprus in the case of The Republic of 
Cyprus v Andreas Costa Aristodemou put it, ‘the sentence “imprison-
ment for life” means exactly what is stated by the simple Greek words, 
that is, imprisonment for the remainder of the biological existence of 
the convicted person’.2 This may be true in some countries and cir-
cumstances, but it is not always the case. One can generally say that 
there are five major approaches that countries have adopted in regard 
to life imprisonment. The first approach is that in countries such as 
Costa Rica, Columbia, El Salvador,3 Brazil and Portugal, the Constitu-
tions proscribe the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment on 
1 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 (HL) 
549H-550B, as quoted in D van Zyl Smit Taking life imprisonment seriously in national 
and international law (2002) 2-3. 
2 The Republic of Cyprus v Andreas Costa Aristodemou Case 31175/87, cited in Case of 
Kafkaris v Cyprus [2008] ECHR 21906/04 (12 February 2008) para 47. 
3 D van Zyl Smit ‘Life imprisonment: Recent issues in national and international law’ 
(2006) 29 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 410.
any person.4 The second approach is to be found in the constitutions 
of countries such as Croatia, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain 
which ‘make no legislative provision for life imprisonment at all’.5 The 
third category is to be found in countries such as the United States 
of America, England and Wales, where some prisoners sentenced to 
life imprisonment cannot be considered for parole, neither can their 
sentences be remitted.6 The fourth category is to be found in countries 
such as Uganda, South Africa and Botswana, where there is a legislative 
framework which allows a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment to 
be considered for parole or to have his or her sentence remitted after 
serving a specified number of years. The last category is to be found in 
countries such as Mexico and Peru, where the respective constitutional 
courts have ‘declared life imprisonment to be unconstitutional’.7 With 
respect to the fourth category, courts in Germany8 and South Africa (as 
the discussion will shortly illustrate) have held that life imprisonment is 
only constitutional if the offenders have a prospect of being released.
In Uganda, as this article illustrates, section 86(3) of the Prisons Act9 
provides that ‘[f]or the purpose of calculating remission of sentence, 
imprisonment for life shall be deemed to be twenty years’ imprison-
ment’. Courts that have been imposing life sentences in Uganda have 
always understood life imprisonment to mean a sentence of imprison-
ment of not more than 20 years. In the 1975 Court of Appeal decision 
of Wasaja v Uganda,10 the appellant was found guilty of the offences 
of robbery and threatening to use violence. The High Court sentenced 
him to 15 years’ imprisonment and 24 strokes of a cane when he had 
already spent nearly two years in custody. He appealed the sentence. 
The Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to 10 years’ imprisonment 
and 12 strokes on the ground that the High Court’s sentence was exces-
4 The Constitution of Brazil (of 5 October 1988) prohibits the imposition of life imprison-
ment on any person. Art XLVII(b) provides that ‘[t]here may be no sentence of life 
imprisonment’. In Extradition 855, decision of 26 August 2004, the Supreme Federal 
Tribunal of Brazil ruled that it could not order the extradition on a Chilean citizen to Chile 
unless Chile commuted the defendant’s sentence to 30 years’ imprisonment, because 
‘Brazilian law establishes that 30 years is the maximum of actual serving time’. See 
http://www.stf.gov.br/jurisprudencia/abstratos/documento.asp?seq=70&lng=ingles 
(accessed 16 August 2007). It has been observed that ‘[i]t is noteworthy that life 
imprisonment is not considered everywhere as an essential form of social control. In 
countries such as Brazil and Portugal it is constitutionally outlawed.’ See D van Zyl 
Smit & F Dünkel (eds) Imprisonment today and tomorrow: International perspectives 
on prisoners’ rights and prison conditions (2001) 814. See also Van Zyl Smit (n 1 above) 
189.
5 C Appleton & B Grover ‘The pros and cons of life without parole’ (2007) 47 British 
Journal of Criminology 601.
6 Generally see Van Zyl Smit (n 1 above) 20-131.
7 Van Zyl Smit (n 3 above) 410.
8 Van Zyl Smit (n 3 above) 411.
9 Act 17 of 2006.
10 Wasaja v Uganda [1975] EA 181.
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sive and observed that ‘[t]he maximum sentence of imprisonment [for 
the offences the accused had committed] is life, which we take to be 
equivalent to a sentence of 18 to 20 years’.11
The Supreme Court of Uganda in its 1994 decision of Kakooza v 
Uganda,12 in which the High Court found the appellant guilty of man-
slaughter and sentenced her to 18 years’ imprisonment when she had 
already spent two years in prison, set aside the High Court’s decision 
on the ground that the appellant had been effectively sentenced to 20 
years, which was in effect a life sentence under the Prisons Act. In 2003, 
in Wanaba v Uganda,13 the Court of Appeal held that ‘a sentence of life 
imprisonment means 20 years’ imprisonment’.14 However, in its 2005 
judgment of Susan Kigula and 416 Others v The Attorney-General,15 the 
Constitutional Court is of the view that imprisonment for life should not 
merely mean 20 years, but that it should, in the words of Appleton and 
Grover, mean ‘whole-life’.16 This judgment is pending appeal before 
the Supreme Court of Uganda, not on the issue of life imprisonment, 
but rather on the issue of the constitutionality of a mandatory death 
penalty in the case of murder. The Supreme Court is yet to hear this 
appeal because at the time of writing it lacked a quorum.17 In 2006, 
11 Wasaja v Uganda (n 10 above) 184.
12 Kakooza v Uganda [1994] V KALR 54.
13 Wanaba v Uganda Criminal Appeal 156 of 2001, decided on 22 July 2003.
14 Wanaba v Uganda (n 13 above) 8.
15 Constitutional Petition 6 of 2003 (unreported) 140-142, quoted in n 39 below. In 
this case, the petitioners had been sentenced to death and they petitioned the Con-
stitutional Court for a declaration that the death penalty was unconstitutional on 
the basis, inter alia, that it amounted to torture, cruel or degrading and inhuman 
treatment and that it violated the right to life. The Constitutional Court held that the 
death penalty was not unconstitutional and that, according to the Constitution (art 
22(1)), the right to life is not absolute and it can be taken away provided due process 
of law has been followed. However, the Court held that a mandatory death penalty 
was unconstitutional because it eliminated the discretion of the courts in sentenc-
ing. The Court held that a mandatory death penalty in cases of murder meant that it 
was the executive and the legislature passing the sentence and not the courts.
16 Appleton & Grover (n 5 above) 603.
17 Under art 130 of the Constitution of Uganda (1995), ‘The Supreme Court shall con-
sist of (a) the Chief Justice; and (b) such number of justices of the Supreme Court, 
not being less than six, Parliament may by law prescribe.’ Under article 131: ‘(1) The 
Supreme Court shall be duly constituted at any sitting if it consists of an uneven 
number not being less than five members of the court. (2) When hearing appeals 
from decisions of the Court of Appeal sitting as a constitutional court, the Supreme 
Court shall consist of a full bench of all members of the Supreme Court; and where 
any of them is not able to attend, the President shall, for that purpose, appoint an 
acting justice under article 142(2) of the Constitution.’ At the time of writing, there 
were five justices at the Supreme Court: Justice Bart Katureebe, Justice Benjamim 
Odoki, Chief Justice, Justice GW Kanyeihamba, Justice JN Mulenga and Justice John 
WN Tsekooko. See http://www.judicature.go.ug/supreme.php (accessed 3 October 
2007). Justice Arthur Oder passed away in June 2006 and Justice Alfred Karokora 
retired in 2006. See ‘Appoint judges, legislators tell President Museveni’ The New 
Vision 15 September 2007 http://allafrica.com/stories/200709170134.html (accessed 
3 October 2007).
a few months after the Constitutional Court’s decision, a new Prisons 
Act was enacted which retained the provision as it is in the old Prisons 
Act to the effect that life imprisonment means 20 years’ imprisonment. 
In January 2007, in the case of Guloba Muzamiru v Uganda,18 in which 
the appellant, a 22 year-old man, was sentenced by the High Court 
(in 2004) to life imprisonment for defiling a two and a half year-old 
baby, the Court of Appeal rejected the appellant’s argument that ‘life 
imprisonment was almost as bad as death’.19 This means that courts 
still consider life imprisonment to mean 20 years’ imprisonment until 
the Supreme Court has ruled on the constitutionality of that provision 
in the light of what the Constitutional Court observed. As at 30 Sep-
tember 2007, 43 prisoners, only two of whom female, were serving 
life sentences in Uganda for the following offences: five for robbery; 
five for murder (all sentenced after February 2006 when the Consti-
tutional Court declared the mandatory death penalty for murder 
unconstitutional in the Kigula case); six for manslaughter; one for rape 
and manslaughter; 20 for defilement; one for failure to protect water 
meters (sentenced by a military court); one for attempted murder; one 
for aggravated robbery; one for kidnapping with intent to murder; one 
for simple robbery; and one for rape. Only three had been sentenced 
by military courts and the rest by the High Court.20 The aim of this 
article is to highlight the challenges associated with ‘whole-life’ life 
imprisonment and to recommend that the Supreme Court should 
take into consideration such challenges and reject the Constitutional 
Court’s argument that life imprisonment should mean ‘whole-life’.
Before I embark on a discussion of the implications of the Constitu-
tional Court of Uganda and its understanding of life imprisonment, 
I look briefly at the question regarding the purpose of punishment. 
However, I would like to put a caveat that, much as the question of jus-
tice is intrinsically linked to punishment, for want of space this article 
does not deal with the discussion of what constitutes justice.
2 The purposes of punishment
Philosophers, lawyers, judges and many other people interested either 
directly or indirectly in the punishment debate have always disagreed, 
and will continue to disagree, on the question as to the purpose of 
punishment. It is beyond the scope of this article to deal exhaustively 
with all the known or continuously-debated purposes of punishment. 
However, the author will briefly discuss the five major purposes of 
punishment (retribution, deterrence or prevention, rehabilitation, 
18 Guloba Muzamiru v Uganda Criminal Appeal 289/2003 (unreported).
19 Guloba Muzamiru v Uganda (n 18 above) 2.
20 Statistics obtained from Uganda Prisons Headquarters, Kampala in January 2008 (on 
file with the author).
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reconciliation, and restorative justice) and illustrate the relevance of the 
question of life imprisonment in Uganda.
The author does not deal with the issue of alternative sentences, 
because in the Ugandan context this is irrelevant to people convicted 
of offences that attract life sentences. This is due to two reasons. The 
first reason is that offenders found guilty of offences that attract life 
sentences do not qualify for community service orders which are the 
only alternative sentences in Uganda under the Community Services 
Act.21 Under section 3 of the Community Services Act, courts can only 
issue community service orders in respect of a person who commit-
ted a ‘minor offence’. A ‘minor offence’ is defined in section 2 of the 
Community Services Act to mean ‘an offence for which the court may 
pass a sentence of not more than two years’ imprisonment’. As already 
illustrated above, all offenders serving life sentences in Uganda com-
mitted serious offences ranging from defilement to murder, which 
attract severe penalties under the Penal Code Act.22 Secondly, even if 
they had committed offences for which they could qualify for commu-
nity service orders, they would have been imprisoned because courts 
no longer issue community service orders as there is a lack of funding 
for officials who are to supervise offenders doing community service. 
In other words, in Uganda the community service orders project col-
lapsed.23 I now turn to a discussion of the purposes of punishment.
Briefly, retribution approaches punishment from a backward-looking 
perspective, that is, the offender is punished because of what he or she 
did in the past — because he or she committed an offence. He or she is 
not punished to be rehabilitated or to deter others or him or her from 
committing crime.24 He or she is punished because he or she deserves 
to be punished — hence the notion of ‘just desert’.25 Retribution has 
been criticised for being synonymous with revenge.26 Deterrence, on 
the other hand, as the name suggests, is meant to deter the offender 
(specific deterrence, for instance through incarceration) or potential 
21 Community Services Act, ch 115 of the Laws of Uganda.
22 Penal Code Act, ch 120 of the Laws of Uganda. Under the Penal Code Act, a person 
convicted of rape is liable to suffer death (sec 124); a person convicted of defilement 
is liable to suffer death (sec 129); a person convicted of murder is liable to suffer 
death (sec 189); a person convicted of manslaughter is liable to imprisonment for 
life (sec 190); a person convicted of attempted murder is liable to imprisonment 
for life (sec 204); a person convicted of kidnapping with intent to murder is liable 
to suffer death (sec 243); a person convicted or robbery is liable to imprisonment 
for life (sec 286(1)(b)); and a person convicted of attempted robbery is liable to life 
imprisonment (sec 287(2)(b)).
23 See L Muntingh ‘Alternative sentencing in Africa’ in J Sarkin (ed) Human rights in 
African prisons (2008) 178 196-197.
24 EL Pincoffs The rationale of legal punishment (1966) 2-3. See also MA Rabie & 
SA Strauss Punishment: An introduction to principles (1994) 46-53.
25 SS Terblanche Guide to sentencing in South Africa (2007) 170.
26 A Oldenquist ‘Retribution and the death penalty’ (2004) 29 University of Dayton Law 
Review 335 339.
criminals (general deterrence) from committing offences. That is why 
some authors call it prevention. The offender is punished severely and 
his or her punishment is made known to others as much as possible so 
that they are deterred from committing the same offence as the offend-
er.27 Deterrence has thus been criticised for supporting the punishment 
of innocent people if the government fails to arrest the offender, but 
must send out a message to the community that crime is bad.28
Rehabilitation aims at rehabilitating or reforming the offender so 
that he or she does not commit crime in the future. It is premised on 
the assumption that people’s behaviour can change through various 
interventions and that they are less likely to re-offend. Various pro-
grammes, such as education, anger management and job training 
skills, are implemented to equip the offenders with the necessary skills 
to prevent them from re-offending.29 Rehabilitation has been criticised 
on the basis that its proponents take the view that the offender is sick 
and thus needs treatment.30 This means that a person can be detained 
indefinitely until he or she is cured of the illness that made him or to 
offend and that, in that regard, rehabilitation ignores the aspect of pro-
portionality of punishment to the offence committed.31
Reconciliation, as the name suggests, aims at reconciling the offender 
with the victim of his or her crime.32 Finally, restorative justice aims at 
restoring ‘good blood’ between the offender and victims of his crime. 
It has the following features: encounter, reparation, reintegration and 
participation.33
Life imprisonment in Uganda should be viewed through the lens of 
retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation, because Ugandan law does 
not accommodate reconciliation and restorative justice in any criminal 
cases on the basis that they encourage impunity. The same also applies 
to African traditional practices and their approach to punishment. They 
do not apply to criminal cases in Uganda.34 In the few cases where 
reconciliation had taken place, it has been the initiative of the prison 
27 Terblanche (n 25 above) 156.
28 CS Steiker ‘No, capital punishment is not morally required: Deterrence, deontology, 
and the death penalty’ (2005) 58 Stanford Law Review 751 775.
29 A Dissel ‘Rehabilitation and reintegration in African prisons’ in Sarkin (n 23 above) 
155-159.
30 J Brooks ‘Addressing recidivism: Legal education in correctional settings’ (1992) 44 
Rutgers Law Review 699 712.
31 Brooks (n 30 above) 712-713.
32 For a detailed discussion of punishment and reconciliation, see J Sarkin & E Daly ‘Too 
many questions, too few answers: Reconciliation in transitional societies’ (2004) 35 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review 661. 
33 David Dikoko v Thupi Zacharia Mokhatla [2006] ZACC 10 para 114 (footnotes 
omitted).
34 See M Ssenyonjo ‘The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army 
leaders: Prosecution or amnesty?’ (2007) LIV Netherlands International Law Review 
51 64-66. 
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authorities and religious leaders.35 An offender is sentenced to life 
imprisonment because he or she committed an offence or offences 
(retribution) and also because the court wants to ensure that such a 
person is deterred from committing crimes against his or her commu-
nity (specific deterrence through incarceration) and to send out a clear 
message that such a crime, if committed, would be punished severely 
(general deterrence through imposing a life sentence). For example, in 
the case of Uganda v Bahigana William, where the accused was found 
guilty of defiling a two and a half year-old baby, the High Court, in 
sentencing him to life imprisonment, observed that:36
This Court has to be merciless if society is to learn that the maximum sen-
tence of death provided by the Law is not a formality but that it is meant to 
be a deterrent to would be defilers. A heavy sentence against the accused is 
the only answer to the rising rate of defilement of young girls and toddlers 
like in this case.
While in prison, people serving life sentences in Uganda undergo 
various rehabilitation programmes, which include formal and informal 
education, vocational training, sports and recreation, and religious 
instruction.37 This means that the three purposes of punishment, retri-
bution, deterrence and rehabilitation, regulate the prisoner’s life from 
sentencing right through his prison experience.
3 The Constitutional Court of Uganda and its 
understanding of life imprisonment
In the case of Susan Kigula and 416 Others v The Attorney-General,38 
Justice Amos Twinomujuni observed, and I quote in detail:39
35 NM Sita et al From prison back home: Social rehabilitation and reintegration as phases 
of the same social process (the case of Uganda) (2005) 32-34. See generally J Gakumba 
Testimonies on the impact of peace making and conflict resolution in Luzira prisons 
Kampala (2007) (on file with author). 
36 Uganda v Bahigana William (HCT-01-CR-SC-0071-2001) 6 (unreported) (on file with 
author).
37 Personal interview with Assistant Commissioner of Welfare/Rehabilitation, Mr Robert 
Omita Okoth, Uganda Prisons Services Headquarters, 8 January 2008, Kampala.
38 n 15 above.
39 n 15 above, 140-142 (emphasis in bold in original judgment; emphasis in italics 
added). It has to be recalled that not all justices of the Constitutional Court expressed 
their views on the issue of life imprisonment. However, there were discussions 
between both parties — the state (as the appellant) and the petitioners (in their 
cross-appeal) to raise the issue of life imprisonment before the Supreme Court for 
the Court to clarify whether the Constitutional Court’s ruling on life imprisonment 
should be interpreted to mean that life imprisonment should mean ‘whole life’. 
Personal interview with a senior state counsel (who preferred to remain anonymous 
because the case was ‘sensitive’), Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, 
Uganda, 7 May 2008, Royal Swazi Sun, Ezulwini, Swaziland, at the 43rd ordinary 
session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
I hold the view that section 47(6) of the Prisons Act (Cap 304 Laws of Uganda) 
should be brought into conformity with the Constitution. It states: ‘For the 
purpose of calculating remission of a sentence, imprisonment for life shall 
be deemed to be twenty years imprisonment.’ To my understanding, this 
provision has the effect of fettering the discretion of courts to pass a sentence 
of imprisonment which is greater than 20 years! Suppose, during sentencing, 
the court does not use the term ‘life imprisonment’ and for example simply 
imposes a sentence of 50 years, does this provision confer the discretion on the 
prisons authorities to deem 20 years imprisonment as the maximum sentence 
imposed? Is this not another attempt by the legislature to pre-determined [sic] 
sentences without hearing the parties in order to determine an appropriate 
sentence? If a ‘life imprisonment’ sentence is pronounced, why can’t the convict 
serve imprisonment for life? I do appreciate that there will be cases where a 
person sentenced to serve imprisonment for life deserves remission for good 
behaviour [sic] while in prison or indeed for any other just cause. Couldn’t such 
a case be taken care of under article 121(1) of the Constitution where the Presi-
dent has the power to grant remissions of sentences to deserving prisoners? 
In my opinion, if the Supreme Court confirms a sentence of life Imprisonment, it 
will only do so in conformity with article 126 of the Constitution. It will only do so 
to give effect to the peoples [sic] wish that the convict is an undesirable character 
in society and should be removed and kept away forever. It would be unconstitu-
tional for Parliament to authorise prisons authorities to alter the sentence in the 
guise of calculating remission. Such a person is not entitled to any remission at 
all. If, however, the prisons authorities think such a person is entitled to remission, 
they should make a representation to the President to exercise his constitutional 
powers under article 121 of the Constitution. Other than the President and in 
accordance with the Constitution, nobody should be allowed to alter the order 
of the Supreme Court passed in accordance with the Constitution of Uganda. 
In the circumstances, where the courts must fully comply with articles 22(1), 28 
and 44(c), life imprisonment is a realistic alternative to a death penalty and it can 
only be a viable alternative if it means imprisonment for life, and not a mere 20 
years as it is currently understood to mean.
For a proper discussion of the Constitutional Court’s opinion above, 
I divide it into a two broad categories and under each category I will 
deal with the following issues: (1) the constitutionality or otherwise 
of sentences imposed to prevent the legislature from releasing certain 
offenders; and (2) the implications of ‘whole-life’ life sentences.
4 The constitutionality of sentences longer than life 
imprisonment
In the above quotation, the Constitutional Court poses a question to the 
effect that, suppose the court imposed a sentence of 50 years instead 
of a life sentence, would the prison authorities go ahead and release 
the prisoner after he or she has served 20 years? What the Constitu-
tional Court is impliedly suggesting is that in some cases, where courts 
predict that the prison authorities would release a prisoner earlier than 
what such courts would prefer, a court may impose a sentence that 
would in effect mean that the prisoner should not be released until he 
or she has served a very long period of time, that is, a period longer 
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than he or she would have served had he or she been sentenced to 
life imprisonment. In answering such a question, the Supreme Court 
of Uganda is encouraged to look at the jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal of South Africa.
In South Africa, after the abolition of the death penalty in the landmark 
Constitutional Court decision of S v Makwanyane and Another,40 and in 
light of the increase of violent crime in that country, at a time when a 
sentence of life imprisonment meant that a prisoner sentenced to life 
sentence would serve at least 20 years of imprisonment, some courts 
resorted to imposing excessively lengthy sentences with the objective 
of ensuring that such prisoners are, to use the words of the Constitu-
tional Court of Uganda, ‘kept away forever’. In Mhlakaza and Others 
v S,41 the accused were convicted of a number of offences, including 
the murder of a police officer. The first accused was sentenced to an 
‘effective’42 sentence of 47 years and the second accused to 38 years. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal set aside the sentences and held that 
they were excessive. In Nkosi and Others v S,43 the appellants were con-
victed of a number of offences including murder. The first appellant 
was sentenced to an effective period of 120 years’ imprisonment; the 
second and third appellants were sentenced to an effective period of 
65 years’ imprisonment; and the fourth appellant was sentenced to an 
effective term of 45 years’ imprisonment. While allowing the appeal, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal held that:44
The courts are discouraged from imposing excessively long sentences of 
imprisonment in order to avoid having a prisoner being released on parole. 
A prisoner serving a sentence of life imprisonment will be considered for 
parole after serving at least 20 years of the sentence, or at least 15 years 
thereof if over 65 years, according to the current policy of the Department 
of Correctional Services. A sentence exceeding the probable life span of a 
prisoner means that he [or she] will have no chance of being released on 
the expiry of the sentence and also no chance of being released on parole 
after serving one half of the sentence. Such a sentence will amount to cruel, 
inhuman and degrading punishment.
The holding by the Supreme Court of Appeal above should answer 
the question by the Constitutional Court of Uganda with regard to 
sentences, the aim of which is to prevent the release of a prisoner 
on parole. Such sentences would amount to cruel, inhuman and 
40 S v Makwanyane & Another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC).
41 Mhlakaza & Others v S [1997] 2 All SA 185 (A).
42 According to the judgment, effective sentence meant ‘the difference between the 
cumulative and suspended sentence’. See 185. ‘Appellant no 1 was sentenced 
cumulatively to 62 years of which 15 years were suspended; no 2, who was similarly 
to 62 years, had 20 years of his sentence suspended and a further two years were 
ordered to run concurrently. The so-called effective sentences were thus 47 and 38 
years respectively.’ See 187. 
43 Nkosi & Others v S [2002] JOL 10209 (SCA).
44 Nkosi (n 43 above) 1.
degrading treating or punishment under article 24 of the Constitution 
of Uganda, article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights (CCPR),45 which Uganda ratified on 21 September 199546 
without any reservation or declarative interpretation,47 and article 5 of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter), 
which Uganda ratified on 10 May 1986. As Judges Tulkens, Carbral 
Barreto, Fura-Sandström, Spiellmann and Jebens rightly wrote in their 
dissenting opinion in Kafkaris v Cyprus, ‘[u]nless one chooses to ignore 
reality, a sentence … with no hope of release … constitutes inhuman 
and degrading treatment’.48
Related to the above is the issue of imposing sentences of more 
than 20 years with the aim of protecting society from such criminals. 
Over time, researchers have proved that lengthy prison sentences are 
not effective in deterring offenders from re-offending when released, 
neither are they effective in reducing the crime rate.49 As the Constitu-
tional Court of South Africa rightly observed in S v Makwanyane,50 the 
possibility of a would-be offender being arrested has a more deterring 
effect than the severe punishment of the unlucky few offenders who 
get arrested.51 Fortunately enough, there is no court in Uganda that 
has ever imposed a sentence as excessive as 50 years, as the Constitu-
tional Court noted. One remains optimistic that no court should do so 
in the foreseeable future. However, to avoid doubt, the Supreme Court 
of appeal should rule that if such a sentence were to be imposed, it 
would violate article 24 of the Constitution.
5 The implications of ‘whole-life’ life imprisonment
As mentioned earlier, in some countries, such as the United States and 
England, there are cases where, when a person is sentenced to life 
imprisonment; it means that such a person will spend the rest of his 
45 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly 
Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 
1976.
46 See http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (accessed 3 October 2007).
47 See http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty5_asp.htm (accessed 3 October 2007).
48 Kafkaris v Cyprus (n 2 above) para 6.
49 It has been observed that ‘… there is no evidence to suggest that longer sentences 
reduce crime levels, except in so far as they keep some offenders in custody, who 
are thus unable to commit offences in free society … long sentences place greater 
strain on the resources of the criminal justice system, undermine the rehabilitative 
ideal, and thus make it more likely that … offenders will re-offend’. See C Giffard & 
L Muntingh The effect of sentencing on the size of the South African prison population 
(Report 3) (2006) 47. See also M O’Donovan & J Redpath The impact of minimum 
sentencing in South Africa (Report 2) (2006) 22-33. 
50 Makwanyane (n 40 above).
51 Makwanyane (n 40 above) para 126.
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or her life in prison. This phenomenon is not only limited to those two 
countries. In Africa there are many countries in which life imprisonment 
means ‘whole-life’, unless a prisoner is pardoned by the President. There 
are also countries, apart from Uganda, in which life imprisonment does 
not mean ‘whole-life’. The table below illustrates this point:
Table A: The meaning of life imprisonment in nine African 
countries
Country Meaning of life sentence
Kenya Life52
Tanzania Life53
Zimbabwe Life54
Ghana Life55
South Africa 25 years56
Uganda 20 years57
Malawi 12 years58 (B)
Botswana 7 years59
Mauritius 3-60 years60 (B)
Key: ‘Life’ means that a prisoner serving a life sentence cannot be considered for parole 
and his or her sentence cannot be remitted unless by a presidential pardon. ‘B’ means that 
reference is being made to the Bill that is before Parliament, but otherwise the law that is 
intended to be amended is still in force.
The Constitutional Court of Uganda would like life imprisonment in 
Uganda to change from 20 years to ‘whole-life’. This will raise the fol-
lowing problems:
5.1 Denial of parole to prisoners serving life sentences: Cruel, 
inhuman and degrading punishment
Section 89 of the Prisons Act61 provides that a prisoner who is serving 
a sentence of imprisonment for a period of three years or more may be 
released on parole within six months of the date he or she is due for 
release on conditions and for reasons approved by the Commissioner-
General of Prisons in order to be temporarily absent from prison for a 
stated length of time which shall not be greater than three months. 
52 Prisons Act ch 90, sec 46(1)(ii).
53 Prisons Act (Cap 34 of 1967) sec 49; and Parole Boards Act (Act 25 of 1994) sec 
4(a).
54 Prisons Act (ch 7:11), secs 109, 115(1) & 121(1a); and the Criminal Procedure and 
Evidence Act (ch 9:07), sec 344A.
55 Prisons Service Act, NRCD 46, sec 34.
56 Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998, sec 73.
57 Prisons Act 17 of 2006, sec 86(3).
58 Prisons Bill 2003, sec 53(1)(b).
59 Prisons Act 1980, sec 85(c).
60 Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Bill VIII of 2007, sec 150A.
61 Act 17 of 2006.
Such a prisoner is supposed to obey the parole conditions imposed 
by the Commissioner-General, failure of which he or she is called back 
to prison.62 Section 84 of the Prisons Act provides for the remission 
of a sentence of any convicted prisoner sentenced to imprisonment 
for a period exceeding one month. As mentioned earlier, for a person 
serving life imprisonment, remission of a sentence means that such a 
prisoner will serve 20 years in prison. Unlike the South African Correc-
tional Services Act,63 which specifically provides that a prisoner serving 
a life sentence may be considered for parole after 25 years64 and lays 
down in detail the conditions that may be imposed on such a prisoner 
released on parole,65 the Uganda Prisons Act is not so detailed.
Section 86(3) should therefore be read together with sections 89 and 
84 to mean that a prisoner serving a life sentence shall also be released 
on parole within six months of the date he or she is due for release 
on conditions that may be imposed by the Commissioner-General of 
Prisons. This means that, if a prisoner on a life sentence were to serve 
‘whole-life’, they would not only not benefit from sections 84 and 89, 
but they will never have a chance of expecting to be released at all unless 
through a presidential pardon, which depends on many unknown fac-
tors. As the dissenting judges in the European Court of Human Rights 
case of Kafkaris v Cyprus rightly put it, for a prisoner sentenced to life 
imprisonment to wait for a presidential pardon for his release, which 
presidential pardon depended on factors unknown to such a prisoner, 
such a prisoner did not have ‘a real and tangible prospect of release’.66 
One has to recall that parole is an administrative decision which must 
be exercised in line with article 42 of the Constitution, which provides 
that any administrative decision must be taken justly and fairy. Parole is 
not a right. As the European Court of Human Rights rightly observed in 
the case of Ezeh and Connors v The United Kingdom,67
[t]he early release, the remission, the conditional release, the parole or what-
ever one chooses to call it, cannot be a prisoner’s right. It may be a factual 
‘expectation’, even a reasonable one, but at bottom it is still a privilege. The 
privilege may or may not be granted.
However, the European Court of Human Rights’ above observation 
should be interpreted on a case-by-case basis and the issue of human 
dignity should always be at the back of anybody interpreting such a 
decision. If prisoners serving a sentence of 10 years, for example, were 
to be denied parole, it could be argued that such a person can still 
62 Sec 89(2-4).
63 Act 111 of 1998.
64 Sec 73(6)(b)(iv).
65 Ch VI & VII.
66 Kafkaris v Cyprus (n 2 above), joint dissenting judgment of Judges Tulkens, Cabral 
Barreto, Fura- Sandström, Spielmann & Jebens, para 6.
67 Case of Ezeh and Connors v The United Kingdom (Applications 39665/98 & 40086/98) 
[2003] ECHR 485 (9 October 2003) para 5.
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serve his or her ten years without his right to human dignity being 
infringed, the rationale being that he or she expects to, and will for 
sure, unless otherwise, be released after 10 years. However, in a situ-
ation where a person has been sentenced to a ‘whole-life’ sentence, 
such a person does not expect to be released unless by a presidential 
pardon. Courts have held that such a sentence would amount to cruel, 
inhuman and degrading punishment. The Supreme Court of Appeal of 
South Africa observed that ‘… it is the possibility of parole which saves a 
sentence of life imprisonment from being cruel, inhuman and degrad-
ing punishment’.68 The Supreme Court of Namibia has held that:69
A sentence of life imprisonment … can therefore not be constitutionally 
sustainable if it effectively amounts to an order throwing the prisoner into a 
cell for the rest of the prisoner’s natural life as if he was a ‘thing’ instead of 
a person without any continuing duty to respect his dignity (which would 
include his right not to live in despair and helplessness and without any 
hope of release, regardless of the circumstances).
The Constitutional Court of Uganda is right to assume that a person 
sentenced to life imprisonment, even in case where life imprisonment 
means ‘whole-life’, can be pardoned by the President under article 121 
of the Constitution.70 The problem with such an approach is that the 
prisoner will never know when such a pardon may come his or her 
way. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany rightly held that 
‘… the principle[s] of legal certainty … [and] … natural justice require 
that conditions, in terms of which a prisoner serving a life sentence 
is released and the procedure to be followed in securing his release, 
should be determined by legislation’.71 Practice has also shown that, 
in cases where the President has pardoned prisoners, no one serving 
a life sentence has ever been pardoned.72 As the Constitutional Court 
observes, it could all depend on the recommendations that the prison 
authorities may or may not make to the President that such a person 
68 Bull & Another v The State Case 221/2000 [2001] ZASCA 105 (26 September 2001) 
para 23.
69 S v Tcoeib 1996 1 SACR 390 399.
70 The President, eg, used his powers under art 121 to pardon Abudallah Nasuru who 
had been on death row for almost 20 years. See Susan Kigula & 146 Others v Uganda 
(n 15 above) Issue 5(iii). In early February 2003, the President pardoned 92 pris-
oners, including a member of parliament, who were serving sentences in prisons 
in Uganda. I could not establish whether any of them was serving a life sentence. 
See http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/115199/ Mulindwa%20Birimumaaso%20
pardoned (accessed 4 October 2007).
71 BVerfGE 45 187 246, as cited in Van Zyl Smit (n 3 above) 409. 
72 n 50 above. In February 2007, the President pardoned over 170 prisoners, but 
none of them was serving a life sentence. See S Candia & P Jaramoji ‘President 
pardons over 170 inmates’ The New Vision 27 February 2007 http://www.newvi-
sion.co.ug/D/8/13/551457/prisoners%20pardoned (accessed 4 October 2007). In 
December 2004, the President also pardoned 173 prisoners and none of them was 
serving a life sentence. See J Etyang & H Kiirya ‘Museveni pardons 173 inmates’ The 
New Vision 8 December 2004 http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/404696/ prison-
ers%20pardoned (accessed 4 October 2007).
should be considered for release. Such a recommendation could be 
made after 10 years, 20 years or 50 years, depending on the way 
prison authorities work.73 This means that at the time of sentencing, 
the prisoner will know that he is going to be in prison for the rest of his 
life, which would surely infringe his right to human dignity, as courts 
in South Africa and Namibia have observed. Dünkel and Van Zyl Smit 
observe that ‘[t]he sentences of life without any prospect of parole …. 
should be condemned as fundamentally cruel and inhumane as the 
prospect of freedom is a fundamental human right’.74 The African Com-
mission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) is also 
supportive of the view that prisoners should have a chance of being 
released on parole and, where possible, they should have their sen-
tences remitted.75 The recommendation is therefore that the Supreme 
Court should hold that section 86(3) of the Prisons Act is in line with 
the Constitution.
5.2 Life imprisonment and rehabilitation of offenders
Under sections 5(b) and (c) of the Prisons Act, some of the functions 
of the Prisons Service are to facilitate the social rehabilitation and 
reformation of prisoners through specific training and education 
programmes, and to facilitate the re-integration of prisoners into their 
communities. The question that the Supreme Court should put into 
consideration before sanctioning a ‘whole-life’ for life imprisonment 
is whether it is possible for the Prisons Service to exercise the above 
functions with regard to prisoners who are aware that they will never 
be released. Why would a prisoner participate in any rehabilitation or 
reintegration programme when he or she knows that the possibility 
of being released is almost non-existent? Even in South Africa, where 
the law provides that a prisoner serving a life sentence will be consid-
ered for parole after 25 years, the Supreme Court of Appeal held in S 
v Sikhipha,76 where the appellant, a 31 year-old man, was found guilty 
of raping a 13 year-old girl and sentenced to life imprisonment, that 
73 It has been observed that ‘[i]t must be recognised that the many decisions taken by 
the prison authorities at every step in this process [of ensuring that prisoners serving 
life sentences are released] may have a bearing on when the prisoner is eventually 
released. For example, an administrative decision not to transfer a prisoner to an 
open facility may lead to a parole board deciding not to release the life condition-
ally.’ See Van Zyl Smit (n 3 above) 415. 
74 Van Zyl Smit & Dünkel (n 4 above) 846. 
75 See Prisons in Cameroon: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions 
of Detention in Africa (Report to the Government of the Republic of Cameroon on 
the Visit of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa 
from 2-15 September 2002) ACHPR/37/OS/11/437, where, under General Recom-
mendations, the Special Rapporteur recommends that ‘[m]easures such as parole, 
judicial control, reductions of sentences, community service, diversion, mediation 
and permission to go out should also be developed’. 
76 S v Sikhipa 2006 2 SACR 439.
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‘[t]he sentence of life imprisonment required by the legislature is the 
most serious that can be imposed. It effectively denies the appellant the 
possibility of rehabilitation.’77 The Court reduced the sentence to 20 
years’ imprisonment. The German Federal Constitutional Court held 
that ‘[t]he prison institutions also have a duty in the case of prisoners 
sentenced to life imprisonment, to strive towards their resocialisation 
[read rehabilitation], to preserve their ability to cope with life and to 
counteract the negative effects of incarceration’.78 Should the Supreme 
Court go ahead and confirm that life imprisonment means ‘whole-life’, 
it would mean that such prisoners will most probably not be rehabili-
tated.79 This will not only make sections 5(b) and (c) redundant as far 
as this category of prisoners is concerned, but it would also fly into the 
face of Uganda’s international obligation under article 10(3) of CCPR, 
which is to the effect that the essential aims of the prison system is to 
reform and rehabilitate prisoners.80 It would also mean that our society 
would effectively have treated such prisoners as those sentenced to 
death — people that will never come back and make any contribution 
to the development of the country. As it has rightly been observed, 
‘to lock up a prisoner and take away all hope of release is to resort to 
another form of death sentence’.81 In addition, Wright has observed 
that prisoners sentenced to ‘whole-life’ ‘“vehemently disapprove of 
their sentences” and would prefer to be executed rather than kept 
alive behind bars for the rest of their lives’.82 The African Commission 
has also emphasised the importance of rehabilitating prisoners, which 
would not be achieved if prisoners are sentenced to ‘whole-life’ life 
sentences.83
77 Para 19 (my emphasis).
78 BVertGE 45, 187, 238, as cited in Van Zyl Smit (n 3 above) 408.
79 In their joint partly dissenting opinion in the case of Kafkaris v Cyprus (n 2 above), 
Judges Tulkens, Cabral Barreto, Fura-Sandström, Spielmann and Jebens observed, in 
relation to the parliamentary debates surrounding the abolition of the death penalty 
in the United Kingdom in 1964, that ‘as a general rule “experience shows that nine 
years, ten years, or thereabouts is the maximum period of confinement that normal 
human beings can undergo without their personality decaying, their will going, and 
their becoming progressively less able to re-enter society and look after themselves 
and become useful citizens”’ (para 5). 
80 See D van Zyl Smit ‘Punishment and human rights in international criminal justice’ 
(2002) 2:1 Human Rights Law Review 5.
81 Appleton & Grover (n 5 above) 606.
82 J Wright ‘Life without parole: The view from death row’ (1991) 27 Criminal Law Bul-
letin 334-57 346, as cited in Appleton & Grover (n 5 above) 607.
83 See Report on the Visit to Prisons in Zimbabwe by Prof EVO Dankwa, Special Rap-
porteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention, 10th Annual Activity Report of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1996/97, Annex VII, in which the 
Special Rapporteur recommended that ‘[t]he prison service should help orient pub-
lic attitude to accepting that rehabilitation does occur in the prisons of Zimbabwe by 
employing ex-convicts whenever there is the opportunity to do so’ (Recommenda-
tion 7). 
5.3 Disciplining prisoners serving ‘whole life’ sentences
Under section 68 of the Uganda Prisons Act, ‘[e]very prisoner shall be 
subject to prison discipline and to all laws, orders and directions relat-
ing to prisons and prisoners during the whole time of imprisonment’. 
Many prison officials will tell you that one of the most difficult tasks 
is that of keeping prisoners orderly. Another challenge is disciplining 
prisoners who breach prison rules and laws without subjecting them 
to cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. Parole has always acted 
as an incentive to ensure that prisoners obey prison rules and regula-
tions because the more a prisoner follows the rules, the higher are the 
chances that he or she may be released on parole at the earliest avail-
able opportunity.
However, in cases of prisoners serving ‘whole-life’ sentences, ‘the 
“carrot” of parole cannot be used as an incentive to ensure the compli-
ance and co-operation of those who have neither hope of release nor 
anything to lose’.84 Research has indicated that ‘imposing [whole-life] 
sentences on violent offenders could result in a new class of “super-
inmates” … uncontrollable in prison because they have nothing else to 
lose’.85 They are aware that even if they broke prison rules, any sentence 
of imprisonment imposed will run concurrently with the sentence they 
are already serving and in effect they would not have been punished 
for disobeying prison rules.86 As Lord Parker observed in R v Foy, in 
which a lower court imposed a sentence of imprisonment consecutive 
to life imprisonment,87
[l]ife imprisonment means imprisonment for life. No doubt many people 
come out while they are still alive, but, when they do come out, it is only on 
licence, and the sentences of life imprisonment remains on them until they 
die. Accordingly, if the court makes any period of years consecutive to life, 
the court is passing a sentence which is no sentence at all, in that it cannot 
operate until the prisoner dies.
Had corporal punishment not been declared a cruel, inhuman and 
degrading punishment in the well-known case of Simon Kyamanya v 
84 Appleton & Grover (n 5 above) 604.
85 Appleton & Grover (n 5 above) 604. ‘In her report … in 2004, the Ombudswoman 
criticised the Cypriot authorities’ interpretation of life sentence as imprisonment for 
the rest of the convicted person’s life … The Deputy Director of the Central Prison 
spoke of the difficulties in dealing with those currently serving life sentence … 
both in terms of the prisoners’ morale, and security issues. The usual incentives for 
encouraging good behaviour in prisoners were inevitably of no use in relation to 
those serving life sentences, and this posed security problems both for the warders 
and for the other prisoners.’ See Follow-up Report on Cyprus (2003-2005) ‘Assess-
ment of the progress made in implementing the recommendations of the Council of 
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights’ Doc Comm DH (2006) 12, cited in Kafkaris 
v Cyprus (n 2 above) para 73.
86 See generally S Rahman ‘Addressing anomalies created by the fiction of life imprison-
ment’ (2000) 8 Waikato Law Review 87. 
87 R v Foy [1962] 2 All ER 246 247.
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Uganda,88 one could have argued that such prisoners could be sub-
jected to corporal punishment. It appears under the Prisons Act that the 
only serious punishment that could be imposed on a prisoner serving 
a ‘whole-life’ would be punishment by close confinement under sec-
tion 94. But even then, before this punishment is imposed, the medical 
officer must first examine such a prisoner and certify in writing that he 
or she is fit to undergo such punishment. The medical officer is also 
required to advise the officer in charge to terminate such a confine-
ment if he or she considers it necessary on the ground of physical or 
mental health. It is also unlikely that a prisoner can be denied his rights, 
such as the right to food and/or to exercise, as a form of punishment 
because these are rights under sections 69 and 70 of the Prisons Act 
but not privileges. Any punishment imposed must also comply with 
rules 27 to 32 of the United Nations (UN) Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Treatment of Prisoners.89 What this discussion has attempted 
to illustrate is that, for proper discipline among prisoners, it is essential 
that they should expect to be released. The Supreme Court should 
therefore put that into consideration before it confirms the Constitu-
tional Court’s ruling that life should mean ‘whole-life’.
6 Does ‘whole-life’ have support in international 
criminal law?
Under contemporary international criminal law, one would have to 
look at three international courts to ascertain whether the ‘whole-life’ 
approach has any support at that level.90 These courts are the Interna-
88 Simon Kyamanya v Uganda Constitutional Reference 10 of 2000.
89 Adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders, held at Geneva in 1955, and approved by the Economic and 
Social Council by its Resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957 and 2076 (LXII) of 13 
May 1977. 
90 It should also be recalled that both the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
(Nuremberg Tribunal) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo 
Tribunal) sentenced some war criminals to life imprisonment. The Nuremberg Tri-
bunal sentenced three defendants to life imprisonment (Rudolf Hess, Walter Funk 
and Erich Raeder); see The Trial of German Major War Criminals: Proceedings of the 
International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg Germany Part 22 (22-31 August 
1946 and 30 September-1 October 1946) (1950) 529. Funk and Raeder were released 
after serving a considerable amount of years because their health had deteriorated. 
Even though his life had also deteriorated, Hess’s release was vetoed by the Russians 
until he committed suicide in prison. See C Kress & G Sluiter ‘Imprisonment’ in 
A Cassese (ed) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A commentary 
(2002) 1762. It should be remembered that the Spandau Prison in Germany, where 
the prisoners were serving their sentences, ‘was administered and guarded jointly 
by the four Allied Powers: the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom and the 
United States’ and therefore all the representatives of all the Allied Powers had to 
consent for any prisoner to be released. See D Kamchibekova ‘State responsibility for 
extra-territorial human rights violations’ (2007) 13 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 
87 124. The reason why Hess was not released could be attributed to the fact that the 
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone. Of the three courts, emphasis will be put on the ICTR, 
because it is the only one that has sentenced and actually has prisoners 
serving life sentences.
6.1 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Of all civil wars that have taken place in the world and in Africa in 
particular, with all their unspeakable human rights and international 
humanitarian law violations, the Rwandan genocide of 1994 that 
claimed close to one million lives was clearly in a class of its own. Tens 
of thousand of innocent men, women and children were massacred 
because of their ethnicity. These atrocities could not go unpunished 
and hence the establishment of the ICTR. The Statute of the ICTR 
empowers the Tribunal to91
prosecute persons responsible for  serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan 
citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neigh-
bouring States  between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.
Hence the ICTR has jurisdictions over the offences of genocide,92 crimes 
Soviet judge at the Tribunal, Major General IT Nikitchenko, wrote a dissenting judg-
ment holding that Hess should have been sentenced to death by hanging instead 
of life imprisonment. After indicating clearly the role Hess had played in the Nazi 
government, Major General Nikitchenko held that ‘[t]aking into consideration that 
among the political leaders of Hitlerite Germany Hess was third in significance and 
played a decisive role in the crimes of the Nazi regime, I consider the only justified 
sentence in his case can be death’. See Dissenting Opinion of the Soviet Member 
of the International Military Tribunal in The Trial of German Major War Criminals: 
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg Germany 
Part 22 (22-31 August 1946 and 30 September-1 October 1946) (1950) 541. On the 
other hand, the Tokyo Tribunal sentenced the following accused to imprisonment 
for life: Araki Sadao, Hashimoto Kingoro, Hata Shunroku, Hiranuma Kiichiro, Hoshino 
Naoki, Kido Koichi, Koiso Kuniaki, Minimi Jiro, Oka Takasumi, Oshima Hiroshi, Sato 
Kenryo, Shimada Shigetaro, Suzuki Teiichi, Kaya, Shiratori and Umezu. See BVA 
Röling & CF Rüter The Tokyo judgment: The International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East (IMTFE) 29 April 1946-12 November 1948 (1977) 465-466. It has been observed 
in relation to prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment by the Tokyo Tribunal that 
‘[n]ot a single Tokyo defendant … actually served his life sentence “unless he died 
of natural causes within a very few years. They were all paroled and pardoned by 
1958.”’ See MM Penrose ‘Spandau revisited: The question of detention for inter-
national war crimes’ (2000) 16 New York Law School Journal of Human Rights 553 
564-565. It should also be recalled that, unlike the life sentences imposed by the 
Nuremberg Tribunal where there was no law specifically stipulating the minimum 
number of years to be served before a prisoner could be released for parole, with 
regard to the sentences by the Tokyo Tribunal, ‘[t]he Supreme Commander General 
did lay down criteria for early release :… offenders sentenced to life imprisonment 
were to be considered for parole after they had served 15 years’. See D van Zyl Smit 
‘International imprisonment’ (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
357-385 359. 
91 Art 1.
92 Art 2.
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against humanity93 and violations of article 3 Common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.94 Under article 23 the Tribu-
nal has jurisdiction to impose the following sentences:
(1) The penalty imposed by the Trial Chambers shall be limited to 
imprisonment. In determining the terms of imprisonment, the 
Trial Chambers shall have recourse to the general practice regard-
ing prison sentences in the courts of Rwanda.
(2) In imposing the sentences, the Trial Chambers should take into 
account such factors as the gravity of the offence and the indi-
vidual circumstances of the convicted person.
(3) In addition to imprisonment, the Trial Chambers may order the 
return of any property and proceeds acquired by criminal con-
duct, including by means of duress, to their rightful owners.
Another important feature to note with regard to the punishments that 
can be imposed by the ICTR is article 27, which provides as follows:95
If, pursuant to the applicable law of the state in which the convicted person 
is imprisoned, he or she is eligible for pardon or commutation of sentence, 
the state concerned shall notify the International Tribunal for Rwanda 
accordingly. There shall only be pardon or commutation of sentence if the 
President of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, in consultation with the 
judges, so decides on the basis of the interests of justice and the general 
principles of law.
As of 2 March 2008, the ICTR had completed 35 cases in some of which 
the accused were found guilty of committing acts of genocide. Whereas 
the ICTR has sentenced some offenders to short prison terms ranging 
from six to 15 years,96 long prison sentences ranging from 25 to 45 
93 Art 3.
94 Art 4.
95 Van Zyl Smit points out that ‘[t]he major difficulty [with a provision such as this one] 
is that the trigger lies in the national law of the states, which may vary greatly. This 
results in the same sentence being implemented for different for different periods 
depending on where it is served.’ See Van Zyl Smit (n 80 above) 9. See also Rules 
124-126 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
96 See Prosecutor v Paul Bisengimana Case ICTR-00-60 (the offender was sentenced 
to 15 years’ imprisonment); Prosecutor v Samuel Imanishimwe Case ICTR-99-46 
(the offender was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment); Prosecutor v Elizapah 
Ntakirutimana Case ICTR-96-10 and ICTR-96-17 (the offender was sentenced to 10 
years’ imprisonment); Prosecutor v Joseph Nzabirinda Case ICTR-01-77 (the offender 
was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment); Prosecutor v Georges Ruggiu Case 
ICTR-97-32 (the offender was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment); Prosecutor v 
Joseph Serugendo Case ICTR-2005-84 (the offender was sentenced to six years’ impris-
onment); Prosecutor v Omar Serushago Case ICTR-98-39 (the offender was sentenced 
to 15 years’ imprisonment); Prosecutor v Tharcisse Muvunyi Case ICTR-2000-55 (the 
offender was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment); and Prosecutor v Athanase 
Seromba Case ICTR-2001-66. 
years,97 life imprisonment,98 and ‘imprisonment for the remainder of 
the offender’s life’,99 the statistics show that the ICTR has sentenced 
more people to be in prison for the remainder of their lives than to 
life imprisonment. Under article 23, the Tribunal is given the powers 
to impose the penalty of ‘imprisonment’ among other penalties. The 
Statute does not stipulate the maximum or minimum numbers of years 
to which the Tribunal can sentence a person to imprisonment.100 How-
ever, the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide under rule 
101(A) that ‘[a] person convicted by the Tribunal may be sentenced to 
imprisonment for a fixed term or the remainder of his life’.101 One could 
argue that, even in cases where the Tribunal has pronounced that the 
offenders should be in prison for the rest of their lives; this may not 
mean exactly that. If such offenders were imprisoned in countries such 
as South Africa or Namibia, where courts have held that a prison term 
that would make it impossible for a prisoner to benefit from release after 
serving some time in prison amounts to a cruel, inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment or punishment, it is more likely that article 27 would be 
invoked and such people considered for release without spending their 
natural lives in prison. Therefore, the ‘whole-life’ approach has little 
support, if any, under the jurisprudence of the ICTR.
6.2 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International 
Criminal Court
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) is a hybrid court that was 
established by agreement between the UN and the government of 
Sierra Leone pursuant UN Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) of 
97 Prosecutor v Juvenal Kajelijeli Case ICTR-98-44 (the offender was sentenced to 45 
years’ imprisonment); Prosecutor v Gerald Ntakirutimana Case ICTR-96-10 and 
ICTR-96-17 (the offender was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment); Prosecutor v 
Obed Ruzindana Case ICTR-95-1 (the offender was sentenced to 25 years’ imprison-
ment); Prosecutor v Laurent Semanza Case ICTR-97-20 (the offender was sentenced 
to 35 years’ imprisonment); and Prosecutor v Jean Bosco Barayigwiza Case ICTR-97-19 
(the offender was sentenced to 35 years’ imprisonment).
98 Prosecutor v Jean Paul Akayesu Case ICTR-96-4; Prosecutor v Jean Kambanda Case 
ICTR-97-23; Prosecutor v Alfred Musema Case ICTR-96-13; and Prosecutor v Georges 
Rutaganda Case ICTR-96-3.
99 Prosecutor v Sylvester Gacumbifsi Case ICTR-2001-64; Prosecutor v Jean de Dieu 
Kamuhanda Case ICTR-99-54; Prosecutor v Clement Kayishema Case ICTR-95-1; Pros-
ecutor v Mikaeli Muhima Case ICTR-95-1; Prosecutor v Emmnuel Ndindabahizi Case 
ICTR-2001-71; Prosecutor v Eliezer Niyitegeka Case ICTR-96-14; Prosecutor v Ferdinand 
Nahimana Case ICTR-96-11; and Prosecutor v Hassan Ngeze Case ICTR-99-52. 
100 Van Zyl Smit (n 1 above) 186. 
101 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(as amended on 15 June 2007).
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14 August 2000.102 At the time of writing, the SCSL had handed down 
two judgments, in one of which, the case of The Prosecutor of the Special 
Court v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu, 
it sentenced the three accused as follows: two to 50 years and one to 45 
years of imprisonment.103 As Schabas rightly observes, the SCSL does 
not have the jurisdiction to impose life sentences because its Statute 
and Rules of Procedure do not authorise it to do so.104 As with the ICTR, 
prisoners sentenced by the SCSL may be released before completing the 
determinate sentences imposed by the Court, but the President of the 
SCSL, in consultation with the judges, has to decide whether such pris-
oners should be released ‘on the basis of the interests of justice and the 
general principles of law’.105 This means that, whereas the Court imposed 
excessive sentences on the offenders, there is a possibility that they may 
be pardoned depending on the laws in countries where they will serve 
their sentences, should the President of the SCSL agree to such.
At the time of writing, the ICTY did not have any case in which the 
accused had been sentenced to and serving a life sentence. In one case 
of Prosecutor v Milomir Stakic,106 the offender had been sentenced to 
life imprisonment by the Trial Chamber, but on appeal the sentence 
was reduced to ‘a global sentence of 40 years’ imprisonment, subject 
to credit being given under rule 101(C) of the Rules for the period the 
appellant has already spent in detention’.107 At the time of writing, the 
102 The Prosecutor of the Special Court v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santi-
gie Borbor Kanu Case SCSL-04-16-T, para 2. For a detailed discussion of this judgment, 
see JD Mujuzi ‘The Special Court for Sierra Leone and its justification of punishment 
in cases of serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights 
law: Reflecting on The Prosecutor of the Special Court v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy 
Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu in the light of the philosophical arguments on pun-
ishment’ (2007) African Yearbook on International Humanitarian Law 105-137.
103 See also Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa Case SCSL-04-14-T (sen-
tence of 9 October 2007) in which the accused were sentenced to six and eight years 
respectively.
104 See WA Schabas The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda and Sierra Leone (2006) 549. 
105 Art 23 Statute of the SCSL.
106 Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić Case IT-97-24-A (judgment of 22 March 2006).
107 See XII Disposition. The ‘reluctance’ of the ICTY to impose life sentences could 
be attributed to the fact that its Statute does not expressly allow it to impose life 
sentences. As one scholar observes, ‘[t]he argument is not that life sentence is neces-
sarily an inappropriate ultimate penalty for the Yugoslavia Tribunal to impose. But if 
the Security Council had wanted to allow the Tribunal to impose sentences of more 
than 20 years with life imprisonment as its ultimate penalty, it should, in the interest 
of legal certainty, have made this explicit in the Statute of the Tribunal rather than 
requiring the Tribunal to have recourse to “the general practice regarding prison 
sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia”’. See Van Zyl Smit (n 80 above) 8 
(footnotes omitted). Schabas observes that ‘[i]n Jelisić, the ICTY Appeals Chamber 
stated that “it falls within the Trial Chamber’s discretion to impose life imprison-
ment”. Perhaps this was a message to the Trial Chambers, as none of them had 
previously seen fit to pronounce such a sentence.’ See Schabas (n 104 above) 550 
(footnote omitted). 
International Criminal Court (ICC) had not convicted any criminal, but 
what is vital to note is that under articles 77(1)(b), 78(3) and 101(3) of 
the Rome Statute, a person sentenced to life imprisonment by the ICC 
shall have his or her sentence reviewed by the ICC to determine whether 
such a sentence should be reduced when such a person has served 25 
years’ imprisonment. This clearly demonstrates that the Constitutional 
Court of Uganda’s ruling that life should mean ‘whole-life’ does not 
have support under international criminal jurisprudence.108
7 Conclusion
The Constitutional Court of Uganda held in the Kigula case that life 
imprisonment should not mean merely 20 years, as provided for under 
the Prisons Act, but rather that it should mean ‘whole-life’. At the 
time of writing, the case was still pending appeal before the Supreme 
Court and the purpose of this article has been to demonstrate the 
likely consequences of a life sentence which means ‘whole-life’. It has 
been illustrated that such a sentence would amount to cruel, inhu-
man and degrading punishment because it would deny the prisoners 
an opportunity to be considered for parole; it would make it difficult 
for the prison authorities to rehabilitate such offenders; it would make 
it difficult for the prison authorities to discipline such offenders; and 
that the jurisprudence of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals 
also supports the view that offenders should have a prospect of being 
released.
The author is alive to the fact that some people are of the view that, 
when the mandatory death penalty is abolished in Uganda, courts 
should be left with the discretion to determine the length of life 
imprisonment and, by implication, the executive should have no say 
in sentencing. The author relies on the South African Constitutional 
Court’s jurisprudence to argue against that view and to maintain his 
stand that the executive should be left with the discretion, through 
legislation and remissions or commutations of sentences, to determine 
the meaning of the length of a prison sentence imposed by the courts 
in practice. This is because it is the executive, through the Uganda Pris-
ons Service, that is to build prisons, feed prisoners, offer them medical 
care, rehabilitate them and ensure that they are detained in humane 
108 As early as 1990, the International Law Commission failed to support ‘whole-life’ 
sentences. It has been observed that during that time, ‘… the Commissioners … con-
sidered whether life imprisonment as an alternative ultimate penalty [to the death 
sentence] would satisfy human rights norms. Of particular concern was the notion 
that no system of punishment that recognised human dignity of offenders could 
impose a penalty that excluded them permanently from society. Not only was the 
death penalty fundamentally unacceptable from this perspective, but life sentence 
prisoners would also have the prospect of release.’ See Van Zyl Smit (n 80 above) 6 
(footnotes omitted).
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conditions. To deny the executive a say in sentencing would not only be 
unreasonable, but also impractical. The Constitutional Court of South 
Africa rightly held in S v Dodo that ‘[w]hen the nature and process of 
punishment is considered in its totality, it is apparent that all three 
branches of the state play a functional role and must necessarily do 
so’ and that the executive has ‘a general interest in sentencing policy, 
penology and the extent to which correctional institutions are used to 
further the various objectives of punishment’.109 Thus, by stipulating 
that life imprisonment should mean 20 years, the executive is not in 
any way interfering with the independence of the judiciary. If courts 
were left with an unrestricted discretion to determine the meaning of 
life imprisonment, one should expect inconsistencies and discrepan-
cies in sentences for the same offences but by different judges or the 
same judge. A person’s ethnic group, for example, may influence the 
judge to impose a longer prison sentence.
109 S v Dodo 2001 5 BCLR 423 (CC) paras 22-23 (footnotes omitted).
